Practical Travel Safety Issues - TSA checking employees.

Now to make some you happy:
TSA now doing random employee checks. Items taken from an employees lunch. A soft drink & yougart. They said the yougart was a liquid.
I hope you all feel safer now & are happy!

Time for the employees to speak up about how they AND the passengers are treated. @:-)

Now to make some you happy:
TSA now doing random employee checks. Items taken from an employees lunch. A soft drink & yougart. They said the yougart was a liquid.

The soft drink wasn't a liquid?

I think they were looking for something to eat:rolleyes:

I canno wait for the TSA to start taking tools off aircraft maintenance mechanics. That should be very interesting!

Will this insanity never stop?

Now to make some you happy:
TSA now doing random employee checks. Items taken from an employees lunch. A soft drink & yougart. They said the yougart was a liquid.
I hope you all feel safer now & are happy!

I'll feel safer when the TSA is disbanded. I don't trust or expect the TSA to effectively police its own any more than I trust or expect or want them to effectively police everyone else.

I don't feel safer but I am happy. Perhaps employee screening will bring more attention to the riduculousness of the policies we've had to endure since 8/10.

Typical AFTER THE FACT move by the TSA.

You're doing a heck of a job, Hawley!

The soft drink wasn't a liquid?

No, It's wasn't liquid at all with soda drinking. I think airlines employees can bring the bottled water go beyond secure area.

No, It's wasn't liquid at all with soda drinking. I think airlines employees can bring the bottled water go beyond secure area.

That's what we were told & supposedly TSA was told not to mess with employee lunches & drinks.

I'm waiting for some reporter type to realize the two-tier structure that exists at most major airports:

1. Casual employees, such as bookstores, cleaning, suppliers, etc. who may work at the airport for a few days or a few weeks before disappearing into thin air. There are not enough hours in the day to do complete background checks on these employees and the cost of any thorough check would be more than they ever earn in wages. These are the employees with no verifiable addresses or even phone numbers. They may not have access to the most sensitive areas, but have abundant capacity to act as mules.

2. Long-term employees, who typically would easily pass a routine criminal background check regardless of their affiliations. These are the people who know the infrastructure inside and out and who have the most useful intelligence and casual access to sensitive areas.

The current security checking goes right in between the two groups missing both.

That's what we were told & supposedly TSA was told not to mess with employee lunches & drinks.

You say "supposedly" - may we take that to mean that the TSA is continuing the confiscate lunches and drinks?

I'm waiting for some reporter type to realize the two-tier structure that exists at most major airports:

1. Casual employees, such as bookstores, cleaning, suppliers, etc. who may work at the airport for a few days or a few weeks before disappearing into thin air. There are not enough hours in the day to do complete background checks on these employees and the cost of any thorough check would be more than they ever earn in wages. These are the employees with no verifiable addresses or even phone numbers. They may not have access to the most sensitive areas, but have abundant capacity to act as mules.

2. Long-term employees, who typically would easily pass a routine criminal background check regardless of their affiliations. These are the people who know the infrastructure inside and out and who have the most useful intelligence and casual access to sensitive areas.

The current security checking goes right in between the two groups missing both.


Yet another example of the Kabuki security nature of TSA "screening". This worthless waste of $5-$6 billion annually is just for show. Make a big display of screening passengers at checkpoints but ignore cargo, employees, perimeter, etc. Oh well, shoes off and confiscating liquids looks impressive.

I'm waiting for some reporter type to realize the two-tier structure that exists at most major airports:

1. Casual employees, such as bookstores, cleaning, suppliers, etc. who may work at the airport for a few days or a few weeks before disappearing into thin air. There are not enough hours in the day to do complete background checks on these employees and the cost of any thorough check would be more than they ever earn in wages. These are the employees with no verifiable addresses or even phone numbers. They may not have access to the most sensitive areas, but have abundant capacity to act as mules.



Errr. Wrong.

Casual employees who work inside the secure area do have backgorund checks and hold SIDA badges.

The background check includes a FBI fingerprint check.

Errr. Wrong.

Casual employees who work inside the secure area do have backgorund checks and hold SIDA badges.

The background check includes a FBI fingerprint check.

Which can be meaningless, as our marijuana-moving, gun-toting employee showed.

Sensible screening for all (guns, bombs), harassment (shoes, liquids, IDs, boarding passes) for none. It's the only sensible solution.

Errr. Wrong.

Casual employees who work inside the secure area do have backgorund checks and hold SIDA badges.

The background check includes a FBI fingerprint check.

Correct. They get a fingerprint check. Which typically returns a "no match" result.

For all intents and purposes, they are nameless, faceless ghosts.

Regardless of what kabuki theatre is involved, here are a few basic facts: these casual employees often are not around long enough for their managers to learn their names; they frequently disappear without providing notice; when it comes time to try to contact them after they have disappeared, the employer can't reach them at the address and phone number on file.

Yet another example of the Kabuki security nature of TSA "screening". This worthless waste of $5-$6 billion annually is just for show. Make a big display of screening passengers at checkpoints but ignore cargo, employees, perimeter, etc. Oh well, shoes off and confiscating liquids looks impressive.

Exactly. Assuming one believes the "sterile" area and in-flight confrontations are the risks, the greater "binary" risk is not from 3.4 oz of chemistry set materials, but from using group 1 employees as mules for group 2.

But as we all know: the sterile area is a fraud; in-flight confrontations are less likely to be successful or even attempted due to strengthened doors and an enlighted frequent flyer community; and just steps away from the "sterile" area is a generally unprotected, "target rich" environment.