United MileagePlus (Consolidated) - UAL 872 aborted takeoff today due to overweight loading.

I was on UAL 872 today on the SFO-DEN leg. TSA was doing additional screening at the gate when we boarded. We left the gate about an hour late and we had started our takeoff roll when the pilot cut power and slammed on the brakes. He immediately came on the intercom and said that we were "overweight" and that we were returning to the gate to remove baggage. Sounded really fishy to me. Anyone know what happened? In all my years of travel, I've never seen this.

The TSA sometimes does checks at the gate.

Also, pilots sometimes abort a takeoff. If the plane if overweight then that could cause serious problems. Unload some weight, take off. In the time I have been flying I have been on multiple planes that had weight issues.

cjsnell, welcome to FlyerTalk. I'll move this to the United MileagePlus forum for more discussion. Ocn Vw 1K, Moderator, TravelBuzz and United.

Perhaps move this to the Pilot Q&A forum?

Could have been a weight and balance issue. There have been a few times that I can remember where pilots realized that the cargo had been distributed incorrectly and had to return to the gate to have it reshuffled.

The TSA sometimes does checks at the gate.

Also, pilots sometimes abort a takeoff. If the plane if overweight then that could cause serious problems. Unload some weight, take off. In the time I have been flying I have been on multiple planes that had weight issues.

Does the plane have any actually detectors for weight (besides anything that would be calculated based on the distribution of the fuel)? Weight and balance is done by calculation as best I know.

I suppose the pilot could have figured out that the plane's performance on the roll was lacking, but even then it seems strange to that he'd be able to attribute it to weight so quickly.

If the plane if overweight then that could cause serious problems. Unload some weight, take off. In the time I have been flying I have been on multiple planes that had weight issues.

The airplane does not have a built-in scale.

Maybe one of the passengers ate too much Ghirardelli before they got on the plane?

The TSA sometimes does checks at the gate.

Also, pilots sometimes abort a takeoff. If the plane if overweight then that could cause serious problems. Unload some weight, take off. In the time I have been flying I have been on multiple planes that had weight issues.

Isn't it a bit late to be doing that on the take-off roll? That said, I have had a pilot power down during the take-off roll, extend the flaps, then power up and take off.

This one doesn't make sense to me. There is more to this story, I guarantee it.

This happened to me long ago on a UA DC-10 going SFO-HNL or LAX-HNL (it was a reward ticket, so it doesn't show up on my MP archive printout ;)). We took off after returning to the gate and doing some unloading. I don't recall any other time I've had an aborted takeoff.

Summer take-offs in DEN can be a problem: an airplane needs a longer runway -- or less weight -- compared to an airport that's at a lower altitude or lower temperature. And it was hot yesterday in Denver. The same plane with same weight might well have been able to safely take off from an equally-long runway at, say, SFO or BOS.

It's possible that the pilots had decided that they needed to reach a certain speed at a specific point during their take-off roll, and that they hadn't attained that speed when they reached that runway checkpoint.

I've had a number of times where there were weight and balance issues but the pilot caught it at the gate not as he began the take-off. In fact, in Dubai we were about 10,000 pounds over weight given the take-off pattern, temperature and wind at the time. But, we caught that at the gate. Seems odd the pilot didn't catch at the gate. Maybe alumniumdriver can chime in on this one...

This one doesn't make sense to me. There is more to this story, I guarantee it.

Makes perfect sense.

I guarantee it.

UA & CO load planning is done differently, but typically, you are to have all of your final weights prior to pushback so any problems can be rectified at the gate, not at the runway. And if he was overweight, when he is punching in the numbers that were given to him at the gate, he would have known then that he was overweight, not at the runway.

Perhaps he saw a giant bird on the field :D. No more to this story then what the pilot said. Everything is not a conspiracy :rolleyes:

No more to this story then what the pilot said. Everything is not a conspiracy :rolleyes:

Unless you have access to United's systems, you don't know definitively just like the other side doesn't know.

Both groups of people that are saying "definitely" something is going on/ "definitely" nothing is going on have, in actuality, no idea unless they have access to United's systems.

:rolleyes:

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect. So with this in mind, pilots are much more careful and wary of their final weight products. On takeoff roll, they probably saw an ACARS message pop up, something that in the past we'd just ignore till airborne. But right now, thinking it might be another new final weights coming through and they were probably close to their maximum allowable takeoff weight, they elected to abort to make sure. It may feel like they slammed on the brakes but they were below 80 knots so it may feel violent, but in reality not that big a deal up front.

Just another example of your United pilots taking the safe decision in a very difficult operating environment we're in right now.

AD

Summer take-offs in DEN can be a problem: an airplane needs a longer runway -- or less weight -- compared to an airport that's at a lower altitude or lower temperature. And it was hot yesterday in Denver. The same plane with same weight might well have been able to safely take off from an equally-long runway at, say, SFO or BOS.


True statement, but the OP's flight was from SFO.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect.

This is consistent with a lot of other posts.

Why are weights and measures now less reliable than they were before $mi$ek threw away the UA systems that worked like clockwork? Is it actual bugs in the software? Do certain pieces of cargo fail to get counted in a random fashion, the same way that certain passengers fail to get upgraded in a random fashion? Are the systems that determine the safety of our flights subject to the same incomprehensible unreliability as those that we see on the PAX side?

This is consistent with a lot of other posts.

Why are weights and measures now less reliable than they were before $mi$ek threw away the UA systems that worked like clockwork? Is it actual bugs in the software? Do certain pieces of cargo fail to get counted in a random fashion, the same way that certain passengers fail to get upgraded in a random fashion? Are the systems that determine the safety of our flights subject to the same incomprehensible unreliability as those that we see on the PAX side?

I don't know the reason why the system is having problems. All I can do is just roll my eyes again, and know that I have to check weights two, three times a flight. And as this crew did, if on takeoff roll in the low speed regime and get an ACARs message and close to takeoff weights, abort and take a look at the message. It seems to be getting better based on my recent flights, so hopefully the problem is being rectified.

AD

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect. So with this in mind, pilots are much more careful and wary of their final weight products. On takeoff roll, they probably saw an ACARS message pop up, something that in the past we'd just ignore till airborne. But right now, thinking it might be another new final weights coming through and they were probably close to their maximum allowable takeoff weight, they elected to abort to make sure. It may feel like they slammed on the brakes but they were below 80 knots so it may feel violent, but in reality not that big a deal up front.

Just another example of your United pilots taking the safe decision in a very difficult operating environment we're in right now.

AD

Whoa....I have absolute confidence in UA pilots, ad, but the part I've bolded gives me pause about the safety of UA's systems. I can't pretend to understand everything that's going on, even including your relatively clear explanation here. But I really am not comfortable with the notion of crews getting incorrect information while in the air, especially when it includes things like weight and balance of the aircraft.

I know that your post was meant to be anything but alarming, and I suspect that the incorrect information per se is not necessarily dangerous. But accidents often happen when a few things go wrong at once. This shortcoming sounds like a potentially significant part of an accident waiting to happen.

In other words, if UA's IT systems are relaying incorrect information to pilots, shouldn't the FAA, NTSA or whatever federal agency be all over UA to correct this immediately?

And not to say that it's the pilots union's responsibility to police UA, but if this problem is in fact significant is the union taking it up with the appropriate federal authorities?

I don't know the reason why the system is having problems. All I can do is just roll my eyes again, and know that I have to check weights two, three times a flight. And as this crew did, if on takeoff roll in the low speed regime and get an ACARs message and close to takeoff weights, abort and take a look at the message. It seems to be getting better based on my recent flights, so hopefully the problem is being rectified.

AD

Honestly, that isn't good enough.

If this regime cared about our safety, then you, as a pilot, should have received a clear piece of communication that explains the cause of the problem, describes the plan to fix it, and provides a date for fixing it.

The fact that you have to rely on nothing more than "hope", five full months after Jeff threw UA into the garbage to replace it with a crappy cheapo version of CO, for something that has important safety implications tells me that it's not a priority for them. And, if pilots are being forced to manually do tasks that used to be done automatically, this indicates the removal of an automated safety control, and therefore, the introduction of a new safety risk. All we need is for one distracted pilot to forget, to perform that calculation incorrectly, or to fail to detect that condition before the critical moment, on a day when the plane is overweighted or not properly balanced and it encounters a critical situation - then what happens to that flight?

All of us have been holding our breaths and "hoping" things will get better for 5 months. In that time, we've had little evidence to support that hope.

Honestly, that isn't good enough.

If this regime cared about our safety, then you, as a pilot, should have received a clear piece of communication that explains the cause of the problem, describes the plan to fix it, and provides a date for fixing it.

The fact that you have to rely on nothing more than "hope", five full months after Jeff threw UA into the garbage to replace it with a crappy cheapo version of CO, for something that has important safety implications tells me that it's not a priority for them. And, if pilots are being forced to manually do tasks that used to be done automatically, this represents the removal of a safety control, and therefore, the introduction of a new safety risk.

All of us have been holding our breaths and "hoping" things will get better for 5 months. In that time, we've had little evidence to support that hope.

It may not be good enough, but it's really all I can say on a public forum. The FAA, company and pilots are aware of the issue. Most of the mistakes have not been a safety issue, but more a legal dispatch issue from what I see. Example would be we have to get a new flight plan if our weight goes up by 2000lbs. We're taking off at 130,000 and good up to 145,000 lbs at that flap setting and power. We get a message after takeoff that our weight went up 2000 lbs. Well, we're well clear of our allowable takeoff weight, but I'm illegal for not getting a new flight plan prior to takeoff. So not really a safety issue but a dispatch problem. However, until we read the message, we don't really know. Many pilots have just gone to planning for max takeoff power or bumping up their speeds just in case there are errors, so we're well above the safety margin. The problem hasn't been with CG or balance issues at all.

Not only that, but our takeoff numbers don't even become relevant unless we lose an engine on takeoff and continue, otherwise with all engines we're well above our takeoff performance numbers. Everything is based on worst case scenario of losing an engine at V1 and continuing.

You won't find me defending this management group for anything they've done with this merger, but I will say that we're not flying an unsafe airline, the pilots make sure of that.

AD

Honestly, that isn't good enough.

If this regime cared about our safety, then you, as a pilot, should have received a clear piece of communication that explains the cause of the problem, describes the plan to fix it, and provides a date for fixing it.

The fact that you have to rely on nothing more than "hope", five full months after Jeff threw UA into the garbage to replace it with a crappy cheapo version of CO, for something that has important safety implications tells me that it's not a priority for them. And, if pilots are being forced to manually do tasks that used to be done automatically, this indicates the removal of an automated safety control, and therefore, the introduction of a new safety risk. All we need is for one distracted pilot to forget, to perform that calculation incorrectly, or to fail to detect that condition before the critical moment, on a day when the plane is overweighted or not properly balanced and it encounters a critical situation - then what happens to that flight?

All of us have been holding our breaths and "hoping" things will get better for 5 months. In that time, we've had little evidence to support that hope.

Where did he say anything about the pilots having to do things manually?

Couldn't it be as simple as not hitting V1 by the expected point on the runway due to weight, and aborting before running out of runway?

Or are the mainline planes (A3xx / 737 / 757) all so much less weight sensitive that you'd never have that problem assuming two healthy engines?

flight systems are not integrated, so blaming Jeff and the company is not valid on this one.

Couldn't it be as simple as not hitting V1 by the expected point on the runway due to weight, and aborting before running out of runway?

Or are the mainline planes (A3xx / 737 / 757) all so much less weight sensitive that you'd never have that problem assuming two healthy engines?

That is exactly right. All our data is based on losing an engine and having to continue. So with two engines you're well above any performance issues on a normal takeoff. Now, how many FTer's here have been on a United plane that lost an engine on takeoff and continued? ;)

We use a balanced field approach for V1, so we don't have a spot down the runway where we can see if we're hitting V1 at the right spot. United also doesn't abort above 80 knots and below V1 unless it's a safety of flight issue like loss of an engine. So any abort for an ACARS message is a low speed abort.

AD

flight systems are not integrated, so blaming Jeff and the company is not valid on this one.

Actually they are with regards to dispatch, flight plans, load planning, flight procedures, etc...

AD

Actually they are with regards to dispatch, flight plans, load planning, flight procedures, etc...

AD

Load Planning is not. You have two different systems, work groups and procedures that are being done.

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect. So with this in mind, pilots are much more careful and wary of their final weight products. On takeoff roll, they probably saw an ACARS message pop up, something that in the past we'd just ignore till airborne. But right now, thinking it might be another new final weights coming through and they were probably close to their maximum allowable takeoff weight, they elected to abort to make sure. It may feel like they slammed on the brakes but they were below 80 knots so it may feel violent, but in reality not that big a deal up front.

Just another example of your United pilots taking the safe decision in a very difficult operating environment we're in right now.

AD

Now that makes sense to me. Thanks for sharing!

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect. So with this in mind, pilots are much more careful and wary of their final weight products. On takeoff roll, they probably saw an ACARS message pop up, something that in the past we'd just ignore till airborne. But right now, thinking it might be another new final weights coming through and they were probably close to their maximum allowable takeoff weight, they elected to abort to make sure. It may feel like they slammed on the brakes but they were below 80 knots so it may feel violent, but in reality not that big a deal up front.

Just another example of your United pilots taking the safe decision in a very difficult operating environment we're in right now.

AD

As a former airline employee, there is very little about the airline industry that actually scares me. I must say that this statement by AD is actually a bit alarming. Timely, accurate weight and balance figures are essential to safe operation of an airline.

UA & CO load planning is done differently, but typically, you are to have all of your final weights prior to pushback so any problems can be rectified at the gate, not at the runway. And if he was overweight, when he is punching in the numbers that were given to him at the gate, he would have known then that he was overweight, not at the runway.


That is what I thought. I was a flight attendant for UAL for 8 years and never once experienced this issue after take off. They know the weight and balance before the flight.

You won't find me defending this management group for anything they've done with this merger, but I will say that we're not flying an unsafe airline, the pilots make sure of that.

AD

Much appreciated. Both, your involvement here, your honesty, and your commitment to safety.

Where did he say anything about the pilots having to do things manually?

You're right. He didn't say that. I re-read the prior message and saw that he described getting a message in-flight that would normally be ignored but now must be considered because there is less faith in the quality of the data they had in the first place. I assumed that means we're depending on a pilot to do manual work while preparing for takeoff and such manual work wasn't required prior to CO takeover. But, I see that was an assumption on my part.

You won't find me defending this management group for anything they've done with this merger, but I will say that we're not flying an unsafe airline, the pilots make sure of that.

AD

Much appreciated. Both, your involvement here, your honesty, and your commitment to safety.

^^

Load Planning is not. You have two different systems, work groups and procedures that are being done.

could be, but it only fell apart about a month ago. New procedure, new people, new something happened.

AD

UA & CO load planning is done differently, but typically, you are to have all of your final weights prior to pushback so any problems can be rectified at the gate, not at the runway. And if he was overweight, when he is punching in the numbers that were given to him at the gate, he would have known then that he was overweight, not at the runway.

you're incorrect. At least on the UAL side, we rarely have final weights prior to push back. A good day is prior to taxi, but that is rare as well. Usually on taxi out, over the past couple months many times sitting #1 waiting and having to ping load planning for the numbers.

The pilots wouldn't take off knowing they were overweight. The problem was the "updated" numbers being sent after they're on takeoff roll or airborne.

AD

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect. So with this in mind, pilots are much more careful and wary of their final weight products. On takeoff roll, they probably saw an ACARS message pop up, something that in the past we'd just ignore till airborne. But right now, thinking it might be another new final weights coming through and they were probably close to their maximum allowable takeoff weight, they elected to abort to make sure. It may feel like they slammed on the brakes but they were below 80 knots so it may feel violent, but in reality not that big a deal up front.

Just another example of your United pilots taking the safe decision in a very difficult operating environment we're in right now.

AD

And why you are the best in the business as far as I'm concerned. Many thanks for all that you and your colleagues do.

you're incorrect. At least on the UAL side, we rarely have final weights prior to push back. A good day is prior to taxi, but that is rare as well. Usually on taxi out, over the past couple months many times sitting #1 waiting and having to ping load planning for the numbers.

The pilots wouldn't take off knowing they were overweight. The problem was the "updated" numbers being sent after they're on takeoff roll or airborne.

AD

Just another difference in the way we do things. On the CO side our numbers are sent to us via ACARS and the ACCULOAD printed with the weights/V speeds prior to the before push checklist.

Very rarely do we get new weight figures during taxi, if we do it's for a runway change or adjusted passenger count.

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.


OP here.

That sounds entirely plausible. The only thing that had me wondering was the beefed-up TSA presence at the gate. I've seen TSA at the gate plenty of times but that, in combination with the aborted takeoff, had me wondering.

Thanks for the detailed reply.

Just another difference in the way we do things. On the CO side our numbers are sent to us via ACARS and the ACCULOAD printed with the weights/V speeds prior to the before push checklist.

Very rarely do we get new weight figures during taxi, if we do it's for a runway change or adjusted passenger count.

Thank you for your clear response.

Despite innuendo and insinuations of unsafe operations posted by a sUA pilot as God's truth, it's helpful to have a little balance.

The two airlines run things differently.

Despite innuendo and insinuations of unsafe operations posted by a sUA pilot as God's truth, it's helpful to have a little balance.



:confused: Have no idea what you're referring to. I've only explained what the OP could have been dealing with on their abort. What this poster said and I said are the same thing, only they're talking about L-CAL operations and I'm referring to the L-UAL operations. I guess it's the God's honest truth if that's what you want to call it.

AD

Much appreciated. Both, your involvement here, your honesty, and your commitment to safety. + another ^

:confused: Have no idea what you're referring to.

Pot, meet kettle. Seems like you have no idea either.

Just another difference in the way we do things. On the CO side our numbers are sent to us via ACARS and the ACCULOAD printed with the weights/V speeds prior to the before push checklist.

Very rarely do we get new weight figures during taxi, if we do it's for a runway change or adjusted passenger count.

Thank you for your clear response.

Despite innuendo and insinuations of unsafe operations posted by a sUA pilot as God's truth, it's helpful to have a little balance.

The two airlines run things differently.

Not buying this post, United's operation is very safe and I for one am looking forward to adopting many of their policies and procedures.

Also hoping some of the pilot pushing and creative scheduling techniques I've experienced at CO will go away once the merger is complete. But that's for another thread.

Too much food and booze in the front....offload some. :D


RJ's are always asking people to move if they need to redistribute weight. So there has to be some calc that says too much weight get rid of something.

Pot, meet kettle. Seems like you have no idea either.

Not about the L-CAL procedures, which this thread wasn't about. I just told what was happening on the UAL side of the house with load planning issues and why the abort probably happened.

could be, but it only fell apart about a month ago. New procedure, new people, new something happened.

AD



you're incorrect. At least on the UAL side, we rarely have final weights prior to push back. A good day is prior to taxi, but that is rare as well. Usually on taxi out, over the past couple months many times sitting #1 waiting and having to ping load planning for the numbers.

The pilots wouldn't take off knowing they were overweight. The problem was the "updated" numbers being sent after they're on takeoff roll or airborne.

AD

sorry, forgot to state...........this procedure for CO load planning.

I was on UAL 872 today on the SFO-DEN leg. TSA was doing additional screening at the gate when we boarded. We left the gate about an hour late and we had started our takeoff roll when the pilot cut power and slammed on the brakes. He immediately came on the intercom and said that we were "overweight" and that we were returning to the gate to remove baggage. Sounded really fishy to me. Anyone know what happened? In all my years of travel, I've never seen this.

Is there perhaps more to this story than just what you described? Pilots don't fudge things with takeoff performance. If at any time during the takeoff they don't think continuing is in everybody's best interest, they won't continue the takeoff. Nothing "fishy" about it. United pilots are very good at what they do. No need to second guess your pilots. They know what they're doing.

FAB

Isn't it a bit late to be doing that on the take-off roll? That said, I have had a pilot power down during the take-off roll, extend the flaps, then power up and take off.

Maybe on a non-airline flight, or a flight in a turboprop airplane where there was way more runway available than required, but on part 121 jet airline, I seriously doubt it.


FAB

Honestly, that isn't good enough.

If this regime cared about our safety, then you, as a pilot, should have received a clear piece of communication that explains the cause of the problem, describes the plan to fix it, and provides a date for fixing it.

The fact that you have to rely on nothing more than "hope", five full months after Jeff threw UA into the garbage to replace it with a crappy cheapo version of CO, for something that has important safety implications tells me that it's not a priority for them. And, if pilots are being forced to manually do tasks that used to be done automatically, this indicates the removal of an automated safety control, and therefore, the introduction of a new safety risk. All we need is for one distracted pilot to forget, to perform that calculation incorrectly, or to fail to detect that condition before the critical moment, on a day when the plane is overweighted or not properly balanced and it encounters a critical situation - then what happens to that flight?

All of us have been holding our breaths and "hoping" things will get better for 5 months. In that time, we've had little evidence to support that hope.

Things like this are the reason that we don't just look at numbers before we head on out.

One of the many criteria that we use to decide to continue a takeoff is what's known as "the perception that the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly". This ranges from previous experience of perhaps expecting to have a certain amount of runway remaining at a certain airspeed (or groundspeed) and not seeing it, to having a gut feeling that something isn't right. Yes, we rely on more than pure numbers when we make the decision to continue a takeoff. Our focus becomes more concentrated on the more serious things as we pick up speed.

In addition to what AD posted, which was one of my first thoughts, another could be that the pilots expected to be going faster at a certain point, or have more runway remaining at a certain speed, both of which could be related to increased aircraft weight. That scenario could be the result of having improper final weight criteria sent to them prior to takeoff.

So, everyone gets the benefit of our intuition and experience as an additional safety net.

Yes, you're right that it isn't good enough, but the question is, what's good enough? Who decides? No system is perfect, and to be fair, our Flight Operations and training center, along with the pilots' own input makes it better all the time. But the last couple of years with transitioning to the CO way of doing most things has been a prime example of the value of our experience in catching little things before they become big things, at least in the Flight Dept. Wish I could say the same in a few other departments:(

FAB

It may not be good enough, but it's really all I can say on a public forum. The FAA, company and pilots are aware of the issue. Most of the mistakes have not been a safety issue, but more a legal dispatch issue from what I see. Example would be we have to get a new flight plan if our weight goes up by 2000lbs. We're taking off at 130,000 and good up to 145,000 lbs at that flap setting and power. We get a message after takeoff that our weight went up 2000 lbs. Well, we're well clear of our allowable takeoff weight, but I'm illegal for not getting a new flight plan prior to takeoff. So not really a safety issue but a dispatch problem. However, until we read the message, we don't really know. Many pilots have just gone to planning for max takeoff power or bumping up their speeds just in case there are errors, so we're well above the safety margin. The problem hasn't been with CG or balance issues at all.

Not only that, but our takeoff numbers don't even become relevant unless we lose an engine on takeoff and continue, otherwise with all engines we're well above our takeoff performance numbers. Everything is based on worst case scenario of losing an engine at V1 and continuing.

You won't find me defending this management group for anything they've done with this merger, but I will say that we're not flying an unsafe airline, the pilots make sure of that.

AD

I totally agree! Otherwise, I would not be flying United's airplanes, and I don't think too many UA (that includes both Ex-Cons and us) pilots would.

FAB

could be, but it only fell apart about a month ago. New procedure, new people, new something happened.

AD



you're incorrect. At least on the UAL side, we rarely have final weights prior to push back. A good day is prior to taxi, but that is rare as well. Usually on taxi out, over the past couple months many times sitting #1 waiting and having to ping load planning for the numbers.

The pilots wouldn't take off knowing they were overweight. The problem was the "updated" numbers being sent after they're on takeoff roll or airborne.

AD

I got updated takeoff weights once after we took off. They were so wrong that we landed at a higher calculated weight than we took off at. Granted, it was ORD DTW, but we burnt less fuel on the flight that the amount of the load planning error.

She was a little nose-heavy on rotation but since both engines were running, it was almost a non-event, other than a little retraining for the load planners.

FAB

Too much food and booze in the front....offload some. :D


RJ's are always asking people to move if they need to redistribute weight. So there has to be some calc that says too much weight get rid of something.

Weight is one thing, load distribution is another. You can have one but not the other.

FAB

Thank you for your clear response.

Despite innuendo and insinuations of unsafe operations posted by a sUA pilot as God's truth, it's helpful to have a little balance.

The two airlines run things differently.

Despire your trying attempts at passive aggressiveness, your posts are uninformed attempts to do damage control for your company:rolleyes: