Checkpoints and Borders Policy Debate - At Bush airport, TSA tries out device that targets fake IDs

http://www.chron.com/news/article/At-Bush-airport-TSA-tries-out-device-that-3659381.php

...Weygand noted that there are 1,300 different types of government-issued IDs, including driver's licenses and passports, in the U.S. alone.

Security and travel experts speak favorably of the initiative.

Bruce Schneiers, a security technology consultant, said the new technology may prove more valuable in speeding up the process than in ensuring the authenticity of IDs.

But Schneiers, who contends "the photo ID requirement is stupid anyway" because it has no real security benefits, said using machines to assist with verification makes sense...

There was a thread noting this was coming but I can't find it.
Anyone had any experiance with these yet? My last two flights, this month at IAH, did not have this.

How many of the 11 Sept 01 hijackers would have gotten the green light with a valid ID and BP...?

I wonder how much these machines cost and which former TSA administrator has ties to the manufacturer.:rolleyes:

These readers/scanners are already obsolete. Easy to by-pass, for lack of a better word at the moment, the technology. 'Fake' IDs, which are real, are easy to obtain and to make.

Sorry, TSA, but another colossal waste of taxpayers' money.

These readers/scanners are already obsolete. Easy to by-pass, for lack of a better word at the moment, the technology. 'Fake' IDs, which are real, are easy to obtain and to make.

Sorry, TSA, but another colossal waste of taxpayers' money.

Not that I'd ever defend the TSA, but there may be some form of method to this madness. I wonder if they're hoping that these readers have the primary effect of making the bearer of fake ID nervous, so that their top-notch BDOs can follow them around shouting, "USB!", and pointing at the offender. Then, the magic "random" button is pushed, and the one-striper finds the drugs/guns/large sums of money (>$50) in the suitcase and a "Good catch!" note goes online!

...or they could just be throwing billions of dollars towards a self-defeating solution to a problem that doesn't exist and/or is totally irrelevant to their stated mission. Again.

I wonder how much these machines cost and which former TSA administrator has ties to the manufacturer.:rolleyes:

THe article notes 3 different companies in the game.

Looks to be 107,000$ish per machine if the numbers are correct.
I saw different numbers in the thread that originally mentioned these.

I don't know how UA's boarding passes look, the common boarding pass at IAH, but I think these systems will take any discretion or minor amounts of common sense that a TDC currently has out of the process. It will turn into a RED LIGHT BAD! :mad: GREEN LIGHT GOOD! :-: mentality.

I thought of this as I traversed the checkpoint yesterday where my boarding pass said LASTNAME/FIRSTNAMEMIDDLENAME (no space). How will the machine read this compared to a boarding pass that just shows LASTNAME/FIRSTNAME?

What about people with hyphenated names where some IDs or systems support the hyphen and others treat it as a space?

Also, does the system just have a preloaded database that checks the supposed security features of a document against the one presented to the machine? I assume that it would be nearly impossible to verify every possible valid type of document with the issuing authority instantaneously. This seems like it's nothing more than a $100,000 black light of doom replacement. :rolleyes:

It will turn into a RED LIGHT BAD! :mad: GREEN LIGHT GOOD! :-: mentality.

The TSA has adequately demonstrated an inability to get into even that mindset, as the "RED LIGHT BAD!/GREEN LIGHT GOOD!" mentality requires that the operator be able to insure that the device with the red and green lights is plugged in and turned on. (See the recent reason for the JFK Terminal 7 dump.)

I'm waiting for the, "it's your airline's fault," excuse when their scanners can't read things like gate passes or interline BPs. Similar to getting the "airline's fault," excuse when the current mobile boarding pass scanner doesn't work for the TDC.

Who's Bruce Schneiers? :rolleyes:

I thought of this as I traversed the checkpoint yesterday where my boarding pass said LASTNAME/FIRSTNAMEMIDDLENAME (no space). How will the machine read this compared to a boarding pass that just shows LASTNAME/FIRSTNAME?

What about people with hyphenated names where some IDs or systems support the hyphen and others treat it as a space?

That's my worry. I have a hyphenated first name, totaling 12 characters (including the hyphen). Airline systems don't support the hyphen, and the NJ MVS computers only support 9 characters in the first name field (and no special characters), meaning that my first name is incomplete on my DL.

If this proves to be an issue, I may have to start traveling with my passport card (which I got specifically because they were able to print my full name correctly, hyphen and all.)

That scanner in the picture looks exactly like the scanner they are using in the pre-check line at BOS terminal A. I was sad then the LLL appeared on the screen instead of the triple beep.

While I'm sure a skilled forger (and let's be honest, a dedicated terrorist will enlist one) could easily circumvent this machine. However, I do actually see some value in the ID requirement so long as no-fly lists are properly maintained. Remember, in the days before kiosks, home-printed boarding passes and mobile boarding passes one had to show ID at the airport to get the BP in the first place. It'll never matter; the guys on Sept. 11th should have been on the NFL (given how quickly it was determined who had hijacked the planes) and without that, the ID check adds nothing.

While I'm sure a skilled forger (and let's be honest, a dedicated terrorist will enlist one) could easily circumvent this machine. However, I do actually see some value in the ID requirement so long as no-fly lists are properly maintained. Remember, in the days before kiosks, home-printed boarding passes and mobile boarding passes one had to show ID at the airport to get the BP in the first place. It'll never matter; the guys on Sept. 11th should have been on the NFL (given how quickly it was determined who had hijacked the planes) and without that, the ID check adds nothing.

There are no controls on the no fly list, thus making this system one more useless expensive TSA boondoggle.

While I'm sure a skilled forger (and let's be honest, a dedicated terrorist will enlist one) could easily circumvent this machine. However, I do actually see some value in the ID requirement so long as no-fly lists are properly maintained. Remember, in the days before kiosks, home-printed boarding passes and mobile boarding passes one had to show ID at the airport to get the BP in the first place. It'll never matter; the guys on Sept. 11th should have been on the NFL (given how quickly it was determined who had hijacked the planes) and without that, the ID check adds nothing.

I ran into one of these pieces of crap at a base once - even though I was traveling onto the base with an officer, the gate guard detained me and accused me of deserting the Marines (years before I was born). At least when the MPs showed up they tore the guard a new one and were falling over themselves to apologize.

I don't expect your average TSA minion to have enough of a brain to interpret any information that comes back. Nor will they have adequate supervision to ensure that innocent folks aren't abused.

I suggest that not only does ID not make us safer, it makes us less safe.

As an example, a teacher of mine had escaped Cuba in a small boat in the 1960s. This made him a criminal fugitive in the eyes of the Cuban government. A few years later, he was on a Miami to Tampa flight that was hijacked to Havana. (in Flyertalk parlance, MIA to TPA; irrops; HAV) He hid/destroyed his documents when he realized that the flight was crossing the Florida Straights. He avoided recapture partly because it was plausible for an American to be traveling without ID.

To leave the realm of anecdote and cite something verifiable, Petty Officer Robert Stetham was killed by the TWA 847 hijackers because they found his U.S. military ID. Leon Klinghoffer was singled out by the Achille Lauro highjackers because his U.S. passport listed his birthplace as Israel.

Do you think that ID made those folks safer? Once the scanning check point has confirmed that I don’t have a weapon or an explosive, why does it matter whether I’m John Smith or Joe Bloggs?

My main worry with those machines is what happens to the back-end data. The TSA might say that no data is kept but I sincerely doubt it. I can see this data being stored and mined, also let's not forget those in the TSA who would love to get their hands on 1000's of authenticated ID's. The danger is very real and as other have pointed out, having a valid ID is of no real value when it comes to screening....

My main worry with those machines is what happens to the back-end data. The TSA might say that no data is kept but I sincerely doubt it. I can see this data being stored and mined, also let's not forget those in the TSA who would love to get their hands on 1000's of authenticated ID's. The danger is very real and as other have pointed out, having a valid ID is of no real value when it comes to screening....

This ID machine is a kickback to a former DHS high up thats lobbying for a company; I'd bet my paycheck on it. Being able to detect fake IDs is a skill and unless its a crappy copy the ID, TSA wont be able to tell.

The same comment has been made for the porn-o-scanners. They say they dont store data, but then why do the specs require a harddrive and a network connection. TSA has been proven it is incapable of telling the truth.

TSA Delenda Est

http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/checkpoints-borders-policy-debate/1355404-tsas-new-id-koisks-morphotrust-usa-rollout-de-facto-national-id-card.html

The first post lists other threads that have discussed the company behind the ID machines.