By Steve Halvonik
TRIBUNE-REVIEW
Thursday, December 2, 2004

A bankruptcy judge today begins hearings on US Airways' request to reject its union contracts and impose $1 billion in wage and benefits cuts on 28,000 workers.
"It's high noon," said Vaughn Cordle, chief analyst with Airline Forecasts in Washington, D.C. "The survival of the airline hangs in the balance."

Two unions, representing customer agents and flight attendants, are threatening to strike if Judge Stephen S. Mitchell in Alexandria, Va., approves US Airways' request. Mitchell is not expected to rule until early next year.

US Airways officials have said that a strike could force the airline to shut down immediately and liquidate, eliminating almost 7,000 jobs in Western Pennsylvania.

Industry experts said that US Airways -- and Mitchell -- should take the unions' threats seriously.

"If I were them, I certainly would be thinking about it," said Ronald Kuhlmann, vice president with R2A, a transportation consultancy based in San Francisco.

Cordle said that US Airways should be worried that the flight attendants' international union has led the call for a national strike if Mitchell rejects the Association of Flight Attendants' collective bargaining agreement.

The international's involvement signals that the union doesn't want US Airways' labor woes to drag down wages and benefits at other airlines, he said.

"What they don't want to happen is to have pattern bargaining in reverse," Cordle said.

Industry experts said they expect Mitchell to rule in US Airways' favor and reject the contracts, in effect calling the unions' bluff.

Marick Masters, a University of Pittsbugh business professor who is following US Airways' labor relations, said that could be a tactical blunder.

"My guess is that the unions aren't bluffing," Masters said.

US Airways, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 12, has said it needs labor savings to have a "fighting chance to survive."

The airline said it will lose $700 million this year and could run out of cash by mid-January.

In October, Mitchell ordered 21 percent pay cuts on US Airways employees. The airline will present evidence supporting its need for labor relief and accuse the unions of refusing to cooperate; the unions will accuse the company of asking for too much and refusing to bargain in good faith.

The company has reached new agreements with pilots and two smaller labor groups that will produce about $325 million a year in savings. But it has been unable to negotiate almost $700 million in savings with three other unions representing more than 20,000 flight attendants, customer service agents, mechanics and fleet service workers.

US Airways wants to cut employees' wages by 6 to 27 percent; end or reduce pension plans covering more than 50,000 current and former workers; eliminate medical benefits for 11,000 retirees; and outsource work that could lead to the elimination of almost 3,000 mechanic, fleet service and customer service jobs in Western Pennsylvania.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the federal agency that insures the pensions of 44 million U.S. workers, is expected Dec. 16 to challenge US Airways' attempt to terminate flight attendants' and mechanics' pension plans and force the agency to assume responsibility.

If US Airways succeeds, it will increase the agency's pension liabilities by $2.1 billion a year.

US Airways held concessions talks with all three unions earlier this week, but no agreements were reached. Several labor leaders continue to insist that the company's high demands preclude negotiated settlements.

After today, the hearings will continue Dec. 9-10 and Dec. 16-17.

US Airways' 2004 flight path

US Airways in the news this year:


Jan. 6 -- Chief Executive Officer David Siegel says that a recovery plan is on hold because of union resistance.

April 19 -- Siegel is forced to resign. He is replaced by more employee-friendly Bruce Lakefield.

June 1 -- US Airways initiates concessions talks with pilots union.

July 21 -- US Airways announces that it will eliminate more than a third of its daily nonstop flights at Pittsburgh International Airport. It remains the region's dominant carrier with 240 daily flights to 65 cities.

July 27 -- US Airways announces its first quarterly profit since summer of 2000.

Aug. 13 -- Pilots ramp up talks after receiving a financial report that US Airways could go bankrupt by Sept. 15.

Aug. 31 -- International Association of Machinists meets with US Airways, the last of four major unions to come to the bargaining table.

Sept. 6 -- Pilots union leadership rejects the company's $295 million-a-year concessions proposal when four Pennsylvania pilots representatives block its referral to rank and file.

Sept. 12 -- US Airways files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy for second time in 25 months.

Oct. 1 -- US Airways reaches tentative cost-savings contract with Air Line Pilots Association.

Oct. 15 -- Bankruptcy Judge Stephen S. Mitchell imposes four-month, 21 percent pay cuts on union workers.

Nov. 12 -- US Airways begins process to terminate its labor contracts.

i would imagine if they strike..then they have a prepackaged chapter 7, and doors close, flights lands, and we are all SOL.

Am I wrong in this line of thinking?

You have to believe management has gamed this scenario. Also that they study history (and remember Eastern). So, yes, I think it would be a quick, prudent lights-out.

I think it's funny that the Flight Attendants would rather have no job than a less paying one. It's a bad situation for all but that's just foolish on their parts.

Well, if the FAs do shutter US (which of all the majors, is the "best" to go since it's impact will be able to be absorbed by everyone else for the most part), that will make the Board Rooms at UA and DL sit up and take notice when it comes time to cut costs.

I don't know where DL stands, but UA has over half it's cuts from non-labor sources, so I think AFA is off the deep-end moaning that labor has taken it in the shorts alone, but UA can certainly prune their WHQ staff and wages a bit more to lessen the impact on "rank and file" folks.

Remember... the main reason airlines aren't making any money is that there is an overcapacity of airline seats. Just as you can't raise rents when occupancy isn't above 90%, you can't raise seat prices when planes are flying empty. If US goes Ch. 7, it will reduce the number of available seats, and the remaining airlines may be able to raise rates. This will result in either (i) no more concessions by flight attendants still employed or potentially (ii) a move my unions to increase pay at the surviving airlines.

Remember... the main reason airlines aren't making any money is that there is an overcapacity of airline seats. Just as you can't raise rents when occupancy isn't above 90%, you can't raise seat prices when planes are flying empty. If US goes Ch. 7, it will reduce the number of available seats, and the remaining airlines may be able to raise rates. This will result in either (i) no more concessions by flight attendants still employed or potentially (ii) a move my unions to increase pay at the surviving airlines.


Absolutely not true. Some airlines are losing money and some are not. The reason some are losing money is that their costs are higher than their revenue. Capacity will continue to rise as LCC's grow and until legacy's have costs lower than revenue, they'll continue to lose their shirts.

It's unfortunate that legacy employees have to bear the brunt of the cost cuts, but it's a fact of life.

By the way, if US goes to Chapter 7, the LCC's will eventually expand capacity anew so it's only a short breather for the industry anyway.

How does Southwest keep making money while increasing ASMs by >10% annually?

You have to believe management has gamed this scenario. Also that they study history (and remember Eastern).

Don't give the current circus that much credit. They are hoping (against limited precedent and logic) that the court somehow prevents self-help. That's the only move--these guys have backed themselves into a corner whose only "out" is beating the snot out of labor. Apparently, labor is prepared to say "no."

How does Southwest keep making money while increasing ASMs by >10% annually?

It is because they have their feul hedged at $20 a barrel (current prices are about $45). The distressed carriers are not allowed to hedge.

If they were buying oil at the cost for the other carriers, they would have lost $50mil last quarter.

This will be the end of US.

It is because they have their feul hedged at $20 a barrel (current prices are about $45). The distressed carriers are not allowed to hedge.

If they were buying oil at the cost for the other carriers, they would have lost $50mil last quarter.


While it may be that SW would have lost money without the hedges, LCC's CASM ex-fuel still stomps all over the legacy cariers. The legacys like US either have to lower costs or earn a price premium, that's all there is to it.

Problem is, how do the legacy's lower their costs?

Do they drop First Class and go with 31" Economy pitch?

Do they shed 50-75% of their flight schedule in terms of destinations, serving only those destinations that can average maximum loads?

Do they drop international service? Or turn the international planes into all Economy with 31" pitch?

Do they move to only one type of plane (in US' case, the A318-A321)? This would require they drop international service since the widebodies would be gone.

Do they leave their partners/alliances?

Do they turn their FF programs into "flight credits" since miles are pointless when you can't use them with any other airline but your own, and you do not have different classes of service?

Do they end all onboard service, making everything pay as you go?

Do they close all their lounges?

Do they no longer allow assigned seats, or if they keep them, end pre-boarding?

Do they require all passengers to call the same reservations and customer service numbers and stand in the same line for ticketing and check-in?

Would any of us who are not already flying an LCC fly a legacy carrier if they became just like an LCC by doing some or all of the above?

Don't give the current circus that much credit. They are hoping (against limited precedent and logic) that the court somehow prevents self-help. That's the only move--these guys have backed themselves into a corner whose only "out" is beating the snot out of labor. Apparently, labor is prepared to say "no."

I agree that they may be hoping for court action to block a strike. The problem is that once a strike starts, that will trigger action from the creditors immediately and start a cascading action that will rapidly shut the doors before the courts can step in. If deals aren't cut at the last minute and a strike comes, I don't think the court can stop the self-destruct sequence fast enough.

The key question is if the membership has to vote on a strike resolution or if the first vote is sufficient. The union leadership, seeing this as a blow against all organized labor, may be willing to let U implode for the sake of the other airline employees. I'm not as sure that the rank and file would be willing to do the same, if push came to shove.

So shouldn't just the threat of a strike/chaos be affecting bookings?

So shouldn't just the threat of a strike/chaos be affecting bookings?

I'm sure it does. Bankruptcy does, strike talk does, liquidation talk does. No one's hands are clean in terms of creating passenger panic. Bonner has spoken recklessly and hurt bookings, the unions have done the same, management has too. Make no mistake, both parties are driving headlong at each other at high speed waiting for someone to swerve.

But for the promo bonuses, I'd have to seriously consider booking 2005 on another carrier, and I've been a FF for a long time. Some customers are totally clueless and just pick the lowest fare on travelocity and haven't been paying attention to anything else.

Ok, so a question here?
I am flying on US Air/LH on a United Star Alliance award from Fort Myers, FL /Charlotte/Chicago/Munich on 12/9 Return 12/18 Zurich/Munich/Chicago/PHL/RSW
Assuming I am ok on the 12/9 since the hearing is not until then and they strike before my return; who is the responsible party to get us home from Chicago? Would it be USAir that the reservation is on, or United, whose miles were redeemed for the *Alliance award??

Just Planning for the worst!
JudyJFLA

Remember... the main reason airlines aren't making any money is that there is an overcapacity of airline seats.

I disagree.

The main reason they're not making money is:

1) historically they've had a hard time making money even in the best of times. If it weren't for airplane and jet-engine manufacturers (Boeing, GE, etc) bankrolling the airlines we wouldn't have a passenger airline industry. Their stocks were always worth sh*t and used for toilet paper.

2) the disappearence of the full-fare business flyer caused by (a) downsizing of corporate travel budgets, (b) teleconferencing, and (c) reduction in the "desire" of business people to fly because of increased hassles and reduction in FF status perks (a lot of business travel prior to 9-11 was really discretionary, and when combined with generous corporate travel budgets it made for a desirable experience to accumulate status and FF miles which you could then use to take the family on vacation and travel in first class).

3) increase in jet fuel prices (made worse because of de-valuation of US dollar - which is partly responsible for increase in world oil prices)

4) increased security costs (security, TSA, etc, is nothing but a big tax on the industry. The industry is hurt far more because of the insane increase in security-related costs than is helped by it).

5) reduction in revenue from cargo transport (this is theoretical, based on the fact that since 9-11 the airlines can only do business with shippers that they already had relationships with, and new shippers face horrendous red tape to ship cargo). The airlines seem to be countering this by reducing baggage allowances (most have reduced checked bag allowances from 70 lbs to 50 lbs).

To the folks who disagree with me, my point was simple, and I think indisputable. Two things determine profitability: (1) Revenue - (2) Costs. Low cost carriers have just that... low costs (although some legacy carriers are now competitive in many cost categories except for fuel). However, $1 of add'l revenue has the same impact as $1 of saved costs. And, costs can't become less than $0, whereas revenue is theoretically limitless. Further, as was my point, if you are a flight attendant, you want your industry to make money on high revenue NOT low costs.

In an industry with fixed costs (be it airlines, real estate, or tire production), each incremental $1 of revenue (ceteris paribus) is pretty much all margin, so prices reflect capacity, be it seat availability, available sqft, or tire demand-- not filling your planes? lower prices!-- filling your planes? raise prices! No matter what the underlying reasons, you simply cannot raise prices when your industry is in overcapacity. As occupancy rises to ~90%, it becomes very easy to increase prices. That's just how the these things work. Simple economics.

Yes, it's true that security costs, taxes, pricing transparency, jet fuel prices, et. al. all are making airlines lose money. BUT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, THESE THINGS ARE EXOGENOUS...

The distressed carriers are not allowed to hedge.

Sorry - it is because they are too short-sighted to hedge. If they cannot even adequately procure supplies needed to operate their business, perhaps they should not be in that business.

The problem now, fenstere is that a reduction in capacity will not automatically result in an increase in fares.

If two legacy carries and an LCC each fly 1000 seats each between City A and City B, and one of the legacy carriers disappears, the remaining legacy carrier cannot double the price (at least for a period of time more then a month or two) as the LCC can add capacity and keep the price down.

US owned PHL. WN came in and within a matter of weeks, US' fares had eroded by scores of percentage points, even though WN's presence at the time was miniscule compared to US'. It was just the fact that WN was there, and WN could expand it's position over time, required US to reduce fares. Because so many people who were flying US because they had no choice now did. And because WN's costs to fly that seat are so much lower then US, and that WN's top "profit-making" fare is so much lower then US's, WN was able to make money from their seats at fares below those that US could.

Sorry - it is because they are too short-sighted to hedge.Actually, you need to be an investment grade credit, or purchase a derivative/guarantee to become such, in order to "hedge" because what is really happening is that you are committing to purchase a certain amount of a good at a certain price. This basically means you are incurring debt (i.e., an obligation to pay in the future), and as such, your credit matters! The only way around this problem is to purchase call options on fuel prices, which requires an immediate and large cash outlay for a derivitive security that only pays you if prices go up (i.e., a call can't be worth less than $0).

I'm just hoping that some other airline will come it and at least take US' elites into their FF program (even us lowly silvers).

I think it'd be good business because, frankly, whatever airline comes and takes my status and/or miles will be the airline I become loyal to. Plain and simple -- and I fly a lot. I could understand why airlines may be wary of accepting DM members in their entirety, but hopefully the preferred members will be "safe." :(

Also, I'm continuing to "fly them like crazy." I like US Airways and always have. I'm bitter about what they've done to Pittsburgh (I lived there for 4 years), but I can understand it may have been necessary and other airlines are picking up service there slowly but sure. NW just announced PIT-MKE service.

I'm just hoping that some other airline will come it and at least take US' elites into their FF program (even us lowly silvers).



Even us "lowly silvers" are still important & I will bet are a big % of the total "elites". I fly 25-40,000 each year and always on US. Taken as a group, we're a big chunk of revenue for the airline. Someone will hopefully grant us a challenge or take us on, but I am still hoping for US. They are working hard to turn this around & I thank all the employees for still doing an incredibly good job despite all these problems. ^

Actually, you need to be an investment grade credit, or purchase a derivative/guarantee to become such, in order to "hedge" because what is really happening is that you are committing to purchase a certain amount of a good at a certain price. This basically means you are incurring debt (i.e., an obligation to pay in the future), and as such, your credit matters! The only way around this problem is to purchase call options on fuel prices, which requires an immediate and large cash outlay for a derivitive security that only pays you if prices go up (i.e., a call can't be worth less than $0).

I think you may be confusing hedging, forwards, futures, calls, puts, etc, Unless things have chaged alot since I spent 2 years on the energy trading floors in Houston (no, not with E), US could have hedged their risk if they had chosen to.

Deep out of the money calls are pretty cheap and protect against extreme unplanned movements, just like what happened.

An interview on Channel 11 in PIT said it all - they discussed the latest offer, and the benefits agents could receive for voluntary separation - $15,000, health care for a year, free travel for life. The response from an existing employee - "Frankly, I hope they go out of business".

When you choose nothing over $15K, health care and lifetime travel, all logic has obviously gone out the window.

Scary

Remember... the main reason airlines aren't making any money is that there is an overcapacity of airline seats. Just as you can't raise rents when occupancy isn't above 90%, you can't raise seat prices when planes are flying empty. If US goes Ch. 7, it will reduce the number of available seats, and the remaining airlines may be able to raise rates. This will result in either (i) no more concessions by flight attendants still employed or potentially (ii) a move my unions to increase pay at the surviving airlines.

So how is it that Southwest is profitable when their average load factor is in the 60s, whereas the legacy carriers average in the 70s and 80s...???

There is no overcapacity of airline seats... there has been an overcapacity of high fares.

Sorry - it is because they are too short-sighted to hedge. If they cannot even adequately procure supplies needed to operate their business, perhaps they should not be in that business.

BINGO...!!

I chuckle when I hear some ft'ers say that SW would lose money too if it bought fuel at the market rate.

That is the point---no airline should be buying fuel at the market rate. All the legacy carriers have in the past used the same fuel hedging strategies that SW uses today to limit their upside risk on fuel prices.

The problem occurred when the brain dead management didn't put the fuel hedging costs at the top of the priority lists when their businesses started going sour and the LCC's were making inroads into the majors business.

So several major airlines "unwound" hedges within the last few years to keep the lights on. Instead of giving up the fuel hedges, they should have been forcing the cost reductions that they are now depending on the BK judge to accomplish for them.

SW deserves a lot of credit for maintaining the financial discipline to have the cash available to be able to participate in hedge contracts. That is what managment's job is--assess the risks of alternate business strategies and pick the one that will yield success.

The management of the legacy carriers all failed that test.

BINGO...!!
That is the point---no airline should be buying fuel at the market rate. All the legacy carriers have in the past used the same fuel hedging strategies that SW uses today to limit their upside risk on fuel prices.


Despite CPRich's comments to the contrary, I believe you do need to have investment grade credit to effectively hedge - without them, no counterparty will do business with you. This was the straw the broke the camel's back for Enron, when they lost their investment-grade credit rating, all their trading desks had to pack up and they shut down.

As far as buying out of the money calls is concerned, that's a strategy that they might have been able to pull off, and looks good - but only now, in retrospect. Given the huge amount of fuel they purchase, a meaningful collection of calls would still involve many hundreds of thousands if not millions in premium. Had they spent that money and not wound up in the money, they would have been crucified for ill-timed speculation in the fuel markets.

There are a lot of things to criticize management for, but I don't think this is one of them.

I believe what CPRich was noting that before US went into C11 - and could no longer hedge - it did not hedge as aggresively as it should have.

It was clear by January 2003 that the United States was going to invade Iraq and world oil markets started to trend upwards. Considering current oild prices after how "well" the invasion and occupation have gone, the airlines should have hedged as much as possible (like WN did) because if it had been a bloodbath and Iraq's production capability had been destroyed - or the invasion a failure - oil might be closer to $100 a barrel. Now, US and the other non-C11 legacy carriers at the time were not exactly rolling in cash to hedge their entire fuel costs for 2003 and beyond (as WN darn near did), but many hedged low double digits and are now paying the price - literally.

Given the huge amount of fuel they purchase, a meaningful collection of calls would still involve many hundreds of thousands if not millions in premium. Had they spent that money and not wound up in the money, they would have been crucified for ill-timed speculation in the fuel markets.

There are a lot of things to criticize management for, but I don't think this is one of them.

I respectfully disagree with your contention that this is not something to criticize management on. Perhaps not the current management, but it seems as though fuel hedging is a critical process that large fuel consumers need to do if it is critical to a businesses' success that fuel costs are predicatable within a range of prices.

An analogy might be for an individual to decide whether or not to buy health or auto insurance. Both can be expensive line items in a personal budget, and it might be tempting to toss that cost out instead of rooting out some other spending expense that is more "painful".

But if you get sick or have an accident, your one time cost associated with that event will far outstrip the cost of the series of insurance payments that you would have made had you purchased insurance.

The time for the airlines to realize their mistake on hedging was many years ago when they stopped buying fuel hedges because they couldn't afford them. Fuel hedges should have been an item in the corporate budget as important as health insurance or car insurance is in a family budget. Sure, you can do without them in the short term, but if the unexpected event (accident or precipitous fuel price increases) occurs, you are in a bad place that is of your own doing.

..

An interview on Channel 11 in PIT said it all - they discussed the latest offer, and the benefits agents could receive for voluntary separation - $15,000, health care for a year, free travel for life. The response from an existing employee - "Frankly, I hope they go out of business".

When you choose nothing over $15K, health care and lifetime travel, all logic has obviously gone out the window.

I guess that depends upon whether you think you will need it, and what you might get on unemployment. Unless there are strings that we don't know about (not having seen the entire term sheet yet and all....)

That said, I think it should be crystal clear that the strike threat may have gotten the CWA folks a lot less of a whacking that what the company was asking for.

I guess that depends upon whether you think you will need it, and what you might get on unemployment. Unless there are strings that we don't know about (not having seen the entire term sheet yet and all....)

That said, I think it should be crystal clear that the strike threat may have gotten the CWA folks a lot less of a whacking that what the company was asking for.

Agreed, you could impute a very low value to a single year of insurance, and lifetime travel on a carrier you think will disappear, but it's hard to devalue $15K cash (assuing it's cash - I don't have the details either. If it's an IOU, that's a different story).

Hmm - I thought strikers didn't get UC. Anyone know what happens if your company liquidates due to your strike?

I respectfully disagree with your contention that this is not something to criticize management on. Perhaps not the current management, but it seems as though fuel hedging is a critical process that large fuel consumers need to do if it is critical to a businesses' success that fuel costs are predicatable within a range of prices.

An analogy might be for an individual to decide whether or not to buy health or auto insurance. Both can be expensive line items in a personal budget, and it might be tempting to toss that cost out instead of rooting out some other spending expense that is more "painful".

But if you get sick or have an accident, your one time cost associated with that event will far outstrip the cost of the series of insurance payments that you would have made had you purchased insurance.

The time for the airlines to realize their mistake on hedging was many years ago when they stopped buying fuel hedges because they couldn't afford them. Fuel hedges should have been an item in the corporate budget as important as health insurance or car insurance is in a family budget. Sure, you can do without them in the short term, but if the unexpected event (accident or precipitous fuel price increases) occurs, you are in a bad place that is of your own doing.

..


Well said. No one criticizes you for "wasting" your money in insurance if you don't get sick, have a car accident, have home damage, etc. in an individual year. Fuel cost/risk management is a fundamental component of airline operations, and putting so much at risk for short term cash savings is just a poor management decision, IMHO.

Well said. No one criticizes you for "wasting" your money in insurance if you don't get sick, have a car accident, have home damage, etc. in an individual year. Fuel cost/risk management is a fundamental component of airline operations, and putting so much at risk for short term cash savings is just a poor management decision, IMHO.

I would respectfully agree to disagree. I think you're making it sound a lot easier than it actually would be for a company with junk credit.

That said, I'd bet that we can agree that we're arguing about whether or not this makes the list of management missteps 23 items or 24 items long. No matter how you slice it, it's a long list, and I hope they get their act together and keep this thing flying for as long as possible.

I think you're making it sound a lot easier than it actually would be for a company with junk credit.

These airlines didn't have junk credit several years ago when they were wallowing in billion-dollar earnings. However, at that time Southwest was entering into long-term hedges for fuel. The Little Six (was: Big Six) decided to spend the cash like it was a lotto payoff. The union got their share, Boeing got its share, and everyone else was lined up at the trough.

I put the blame 100% on management here - they did not do what it takes to promote the long-term health of the company. Their view was: "why? everyone else goes naked on fuel prices" because the Little Six was used to changing their prices in lockstep when fuel prices went up and down.

Introduce LCCs and a hedged-out Southwest as a major player and that game no longer worked. The Little Six costs took off while the competition's stayed steady. Their shortsightedness just hastened their slide into junk land.

CPRich, you should contact me - we're in the same business.

These airlines didn't have junk credit several years ago when they were wallowing in billion-dollar earnings. However, at that time Southwest was entering into long-term hedges for fuel. The Little Six (was: Big Six) decided to spend the cash like it was a lotto payoff. The union got their share, Boeing got its share, and everyone else was lined up at the trough.

I put the blame 100% on management here - they did not do what it takes to promote the long-term health of the company. Their view was: "why? everyone else goes naked on fuel prices" because the Little Six was used to changing their prices in lockstep when fuel prices went up and down.

Introduce LCCs and a hedged-out Southwest as a major player and that game no longer worked. The Little Six costs took off while the competition's stayed steady. Their shortsightedness just hastened their slide into junk land.

CPRich, you should contact me - we're in the same business.

Tino, I won't disagree with your assessment of what actually happened, but to suggest that this was all forseeable and would have been avoided by better management seems like a visit to hinsight bias r' us. I see you've been a member since 98. If we search the archives, are we going to see posts from you glowing about the new A320s and 330s? How much better they were than U's ageing Boeing fleet? Or were you the one saying no, no, they should be building their house out of brick - even though the 737 and 767s represent an inferior product, they shouldn't lay out these long-term lease commitments for new airframe? That you enjoyed the old Fokkers and DC-9s? Or that the union contracts were too rich?

Similarly - I don't know if you're a LUV investor, but if you were - if fuel prices hadn't have skyrocketed, would you be berating LUV management for paying excess hedging costs and pulling down earnings?

I haven't searched the archives here, so if you were the one saying these things, I apologize (and I'd like to get your projection on the equity markets!).

But I think it's a little overly convenient to beat up management from three teams ago about what we know now they shouldn't have done. I'm not a management apologist. But I think there are plenty of areas of blame that are much more legitimate than this, and this monday morning quarterbacking dilutes the real arguments. (See: golden parachutes, not working on the website because they were so sure the UAL merger would go through, poorly handled labor relations... etc etc etc).